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ABSTRACT
EXPLORATIONS OF SELF-SELECTIVE SOCIAL CHOICE
FUNCTIONS
Bülent Unel
Department of Economics 
Supervisor: Prof. Semih Koray 
June 1999
In this study, we analyze self-selective social choice functions focusing on whether 
one can escape dictatoriality. Two ways are examined: In the first attempt, the 
set of social choice functions is restricted to tops only. With this restriction, self­
selectivity turns out to be equivalent to dictatoriality. In the second, the set of 
prefence profiles restricted to single-peaked ones. Here we show that there are 
some self-selective social choice functions which are not dictatorial.
Keywords: Self-selectivity, tops only functions, dictatorship, single-peaked, inde­
pendence of irrelevant alternatives.
Ill
ÖZET
KENDİ k e n d in i  SEÇEN SOSYAL SEÇİM KURALLARININ
ÜZERİNE İNCELEMELER
Bülent Unel 
İktisat Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Semih Koray 
Haziran 1999
Bu çalışmada kendi kendini seçen sosyal seçim kurrallanm inceledik. İncelemenin 
vurgusu diktatörlük sonucundan kurtulup kurtulamıyacağı idi. İki durum ince­
lendi: Birincisinde, sosyal seçim kurallarinin kümesi, sadece en tepedeki seçenekleri 
gözönünde bulunduran secim kuralları kümesine kısıtlandı. Bu kısıtlama altında 
da, kendi kendini seçerlilik ile diktatörlüğün eşdeğer olduğu sonucu çıktı. İkincisinde, 
kişilerin tercih profillerinin kümesi, tek tepeli tercih profilleri kümesine kısıtlandı. 
Bu durumda, diktatör olmayan ama kendi kendini seçen sosyal seçim kurallarının 
olduğu gösterildi.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kendi kendini seçerlik, en tepedeki seçenekleri gözönünde bu­
lunduran secim kuralları, diktatörlük, tek tepelilik, ilgisiz seçeneklerden bağımsızlık.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
In a group of individuals, individual selfish-interest creates difficulties in aggrega­
tion of individuals’ rational preference orderings over a fixed set of alternatives into 
a socially rational preference ordering. The usual way to deal with this problem is 
to design a rule which assigns a social preference ordering to each possible profile of 
individual preference orderings. From democratic point of view, in order to assign 
a meaningful social preference ordering, the rule should satisfy certain conditions. 
Firstly, as specified above, the rule should be defined for every profile of individual 
orderings. Secondly, if an alternative, say x, rises or does not fall in the ordering of 
each individual without any other change in those orderings and if x was preferred 
to another alternative y before the change in individual orderings, then x is still 
preferred to y. Thirdly, the rule should not prevent individuals from expressing a 
preference for some given alternative over another. In other words, the rule should 
not be imposed. Fourthly, if the relative positions of two particular alternatives in
the set of individual orderings are the same, then their relative positions in the 
social preference ordering should also be the same. Finally, the rule should not be 
dictatorial (Arrow, 1950). However, Arrow showed that there does not exist any 
rule satisfying all of these conditions, if we have at least three alternatives.
The ultimate goal in aggregating of individual preferences into a social prefer­
ence ordering (which is complete and transitive) can be regarded as determining the 
best alternatives for the group. However, we know that completeness and acyclic­
ity are also enough to guarantee the existence of best alternatives. Hence, if we 
design a rule which directly assigns a single best alternative for each preference 
profile, we might escape from the impossibility result. Such a direct rule might 
also be more realistic than a rule which generates an entire preference ordering. 
In most cases the practical question of social choice is about the alternative(s) 
which are top ranked, rather than about the entire ranking of all the alternatives. 
Now what kind of conditions can be imposed on this rule, in order to make it 
plausible? Firstly, again the rule should be defined for every profile of individual 
orderings. Secondly, the rule (function) should be nondegenerate. In other words, 
for any alternative there should be some preference profile under which the func­
tion will choose that alternative. The final condition which can be traced back to 
Farquharson’s work (1969), is quite interesting and realistic. He argued that Arrow 
assumes that individuals do not use their skills to behave strategically, they would, 
of course, manipulate their preferences if they can gain from doing so. With this 
objection, the function should be required to be nonmanipulable as well. Under 
these conditions, Gibbard(1973) and Satterthwaite(1975) characterized such social 
choice functions coming up with a rather disappointing result. In particular, they 
showed that any social choice function (SCF) satisfying the above conditions must
be dictatorial.
Later Müller and Satterthwaite(1977) studied on the characterization of social 
choice function. They did not considered the manipulation of preference orderings. 
In this case, they imposed the following conditions which are similar to Arrow’s. 
Firstly, again the rule(function) should be defined for every individual orderings. 
Secondly, for two alternatives x and y, if every individual prefers alternative x toy, 
then the function should not the alternative y. Finally, the rule should choose the 
same alternative under a new preference profile in which the relative positions of 
that alternative with respect to other alternatives remain the same or improved for 
every individual. They showed that these conditions implied dictatoriality. In other 
words, the combination of these three conditions with nondictatoriality condition 
yields an impossibility.
Having these impossibility results, again consider a group of individuals who 
will make a collective decision over a set of alternatives. Here another problem 
arises: which kind of SCFs should be employed by the group for the collective de­
cision? One way of dealing with this problem is to seek some kind of consistency 
between the rule analyzed in making the collective decision and the rule utilized 
in choosing this rule itself. Roughly speaking, if a SCF being used by the group 
does not choose itself among several available SCFs in making the latter choice, 
then this situation reflects a certain inconsistency for that SCF. The concept of 
this kind of consistency first dealt with by Binmore(1975), where he considers an 
example showing that for a three-element alternative set inconsistencies are bound 
to arise at certain preference profiles. Koray(1999) introduces a general frame­
work whichallows to deal with this notion of consistency, called self-selectivity, in 
a precise manner. He shows that a neutral unanimious social choice function is uni­
versally self-selective if and only if it is dictatorial. Koray and Slinko (1999) study 
Paretian self-selectivity where the “rival” social choice functions from among which 
a self-selective SCF should choose itself confined to Paretian ones. They show that 
if social choice function F  is neutral, unanimous and Pareto-self-selective, then 
there is a dictator or a Paretian antidictatorP Koray and Slinko (1999) also ex­
tend this result from Paretian self-selectivity to 7r-self-selectivity where tt is any 
social choic:e rule whose choice set includes the tops elements under any profile.
In this work we investigate possible ways to escape from this negative result. In 
the next section we present the characterization of universally self-selective social 
choice function on the tops only domain. That is we restrict the set of available 
neutral functions to the tops only functions^. The main result of this section is 
that even under this restriction we can not escape from dictatoriality. In proving 
dictatoriality we will present three different proofs. In the first proof, we first show 
that the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives is satisfied, hence by 
Koray’s ro'sult it is dictatorial. In the second proof, we show that, self-selective 
social choice functions are monotonic, so by Müller and Satterthwaite Theorem 
dictatoriality follows. In the third proof, we directly show the dictatoriality of 
self-selective social choice functions. In the second section, we restrict the domain 
of preference profiles to single-peaked ones and find a family of universally self- 
selective SCFs which are not dictatorial.
^Formally, a voter k e N \s a, Paretian antidictator, if for every profile 3? and Pareto optimal
alternatives a, b it is true that 6 a and, hence F{Jl) is the minimum of on the set
of Pareto optimal alternatives (Koray and Slinko (1999)).
function is said to be tops only, if it selects the same outcome for two preference profiles
provided that their firs rows are the same
Chapter 2
Characterization of 
r-Self-Selective Social Choice 
Functions on Tops Only Dom ain
2.1 Basic N otations and Definitons
Let be a finite nonempty society. Let N stand for the set of natural numbers. 
Set Im = {L ···, m} and denote the set of all linear orders on by C (/^) for each 
m G N. We will call a function
F  : U
mGN
N N
a social choice function (SCF) if and only if, for each m G N and each 31 G 
one has F{31) G Im- The set of all social choice functions will be denoted by T. 
For each m G N, 3? G £(7^)^  and every permutation on Im, we define the
permuted linear order profile on Im as follows: For all i E N ,k ,l  E Im,
if and only if am{k)'X'(JTn{l). Now F ^ 7  will be called neutral if, for each m € N 
and every permutation am on Im, one has
am iF iJl^J) = F{01).
We will denote the set of all neutral SCFs by K.
Neutrality of an SC F  F  will allow us to extend the domain of F  to linear 
order profiles on any finite nonempty set. To do this, take any finite set A with 
1^ 1 = rn € N, where |y4| stands for the cardinality of A. Let ¡j, : Im A he a, 
bijection. Any linear order profile L on A induces a linear order profile on Im 
like above, where for all k ,l £ Im one has kU^l if and only if ix{k)D'^i{l) {i 6 A^ ). 
We simply define F{L) = ii{F{L^)). Notice that F{L) does not depend upon what 
particular bijection in one uses.
Consider any m G N, Dl G L{Im)^ and 0 7^  A. C T. Now define the relations 
Ol\{i E N) on A  as follows; For all F,G E A  and i E N, FH)iG if and only 
if We call the preference profile on A  induced by 31 and simply
denote it by
Given a complete preorder p on a finite nonempty set A, a linear order A on 
A will be said to be compatible with p if and only if, for all x ,y  E A, xXy implies 
xpy. Now for each m G N, IR G £(7^)^  and every nonempty finite subset A  of AT, 
we will set £(71, fk) ={L E Ji{A)^ \ U  is linear order on A  compatible with 
for each i E N  }, where £(7l) stands for the set of all linear orders on A, and call 
£(7l, fk) the set of all linear order profiles on A  induced by 31.
D efinition 1 Given F E d ^ ,m E N ,3 lE  £(/m )^ and a finite subset A of K with 
F E A, we say that F  is self-selective at 31 relative to A  if and only if there exists 
some L G £(A., AT) such that F = F{L). Moreover, we say that F is self-selective at
3? if and only if F  is self-selective at !R relative to any subset of X with F e A. 
Finally, F  is said to be universally self-selective if and only if F  is self-selective at 
each 31 e
To clarify the concept of self-selectivity let us consider the following example.
Exam ple 1 Let a groiip of individuals consist of three agents, namely o, 6, c, 
and assume that the set of alternatives consists of three alternatives, 1, 2, and 3. 
Suppose that our individuals’ preferences are as follows:
31:
31“ 3?'' 3?“
3 1 1
2 2 3
1 3 2
Furthermore suppose that the set A  of available SCFs is {Fi, F2, F3, F4}. Let Fi{3i) 
select the alternative which is preferred by a majority of agents. If there is a tie, 
then Fi will select the alternative that is most preferred by agent a. Furthermore, 
assume that for this preference profile we have F2{31) = 2, Fs{3l) = ^ 4(3?) = 3. 
The complete preorder 31a on A  induced by 3i is as follows:
mo, mb me^A
F 3 ,F 4 F i Fi
F2 F2 F3, F4
Fi F2
Now consists of 2^  linear order profiles compatible with above complete
preorder profile in each component. For example the following linear order profile
Li is a member of J^{A, 31):
L? L\ LI
F3 Fi Fi
F4 F2 Fz
F2 F, F,
Fi Fz F2
Note that F\{Li) =  Fy. Thus we conclude that Fi is self-selective at 31 relative 
to A. In fact one can show that Fi is self-selective at 3?. But now consider the 
following preference profile
1 2 3
2 1 2
3 3 1
Let the set A  of available SCFs be {^1,^ 2}. Mon
F2 selects alternative 2. Note that in this case
consists (T just one element L given through the
Li L'i h
Fi F2 F2
F2 Fi Fi
Now clearly Fi{L) =  F2. Thus Fi is not a self-selective at 31, and thus it is not a 
universally self-selective social choice function.
D efinition 2 An SCF F  G 3sf is said to be unanimous if and only if, for all 
m G N, 3? G and a G Im,
[yi e N y b e l n , :  => F{Jl) = a.
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D efinition 3 An SCF F  G Ai is called Paretian if and only if, for all IR G 
U m e N i s  Pareto optimal with respect to 3?.
Definition 4 An SCF F  G X satisfies Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 
(I I  A) if and only if, for all m G N,3? G L(Im)’^ ,
[B c  Im, Р{Л) ^ B ] = ^  F(3?) = F(3?
where 3i |/„дв denotes the restriction of % to Im\B.
D efinition 5 A SC F  F  is said to be monotonic if and only if
Vm G ШЛ, % G C i lm f  : (Vz e N ,\/x e Im ■ F (Ji)T x  F{:R)Tx) F{%) = F (^).
D efinition 6 A SC F  F  is said to be strategy-proof if and only if
V31,:R G L {Im )^y i  G N  : F(3^)3l*F(3^^\i^>,:R0·
Definition 7 Let F  G 3sf and 'R G L(An)^. Write где = {{i, ArgmaxE}) |
i e N ). F is said to be tops only if and only if F(3l) =  F{R), for any R ,R e  
with T'ji —
We will denote the set of tops alternatives by r(iR) and the set of all neutral and 
tops only SCFs by Let us modify Definition 1, for this set of functions.
D efinition 8 Given F  G G N, 3? G L{Im)^ and a finite subset A  of 3sT^
with F  G Л, F  is said to be т-self-selective if and only if F  is self-selective at each 
IR € UmeN relative to any finite subset A  of 3\f^  with F  G Л.
D efinition 9 An agent j  is said to be dictator if and only if
Vm G N,V3i G Ц1т)^ : F(3i) =  ArgmaxR^
Moreover, F  is said to be dictatorial SCF, if there exists some agent j  E N  
satisfying above property.
Throughout the next section, we will use F  for -> Im, where Fm is
the restriction oi F  to with m € N being kept fixed if not stated otherwise.
2.2 Results
Proposition  1 Let F  € be a unanimous SCF. If F  is r-self-selective then F
is Paretian.
Proof: Firstly note that, for any m G N ,3^  e and a e r{0i), there exists
G G Tf’’ such that G{Jl) = a.
Now assume that F  is r-self-selective. Take any 31 G £ (/^ )^ , set F{01) = a. 
Suppose that there exists some b E Pareto dominating a with respect to 5i. Since 
a is Pareto dominated by b, then a ^ r(3l). Let c G r(iR) and consider another 
profile 31 G , which is obtained from 3?, just by pushing a to the bottom of
each individual preference ordering. Since F  is tops only, then F (^ ) = F{3V) = a. 
Take some G G 3sf^  such that G(3l) =  c. It follows that also G(^) =  c. Set 
A  = {F ,G j. Clearly, = {Z}, where G F F  for all i G N. Now F{L) = F
since F is r-self-selective. But unanimity of F  implies that F{L) = G as well, a 
contradiction. So, F  is Paretian. ■
P roposition  2 Let F  G be a unanimous SCF. If F  is r-self-selective, then 
F{Ji) G t {JV) for each 3? G
Proof: Assume that F(3i) = a ^ t {^)· Consider IR which is obtained from 3? just 
by pushing a to the bottom of each individual’s preference ordering. Since tops did 
not change, F(!R) =  a. But obviously, a is Pareto dominated at ^  in contradiction 
with Proposition 1. Thus, F(!R) G r(3?). ■
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Proposition 3 Let P  G be a unanimous r-self-selective SCF,  and m i, m2 G N 
such that mi ^  m2 . If IR G Öl G £ (/^ 2 )^ Argmax!R* = ArgmaxIR' for
each i E N,  then P(iR) =  F{01).
Proof: If ArgmaxiR* = a for all i E N, then from unanimity F{‘Jl) =  a. Since 
ArgrnaxlR* = Argmax!R* for each  ^ G A’ by hypothesis, we have P (^ ) =  a. Now 
assume that F{01) = a =  ArgmaxiR* for some i E N  and there exist some j  E 
N,b E Im^  such that ArgrnaxIR·  ^ = b ^  a, and F{01) =  b. Take some G G 3sT^ such 
that GfIR) = b. Set A i =  {F,G}. Then L(Ai,iR) =  {Li} for some Li G L(Ai)^. 
By r-self-selectivity, F{Li) — F. Now take some H E W  such that H{01) =  a. 
Set A2 = {F, H}. Then L·{A2,Öl) = {L2} for some L2 E £ ( ^ 2)^. Again by r-self- 
selectivity, F (L2) =  F. Now define a bijection a \ A \ A 2 such that a{F) = 
H,a{G) = F. By neutrality^,
F{L2) = a{F{L,^)) -  a{F{L2)) =  a{F) = H.
However, this contradicts with ^ ( ¿ 2) =  F. So, F(IR) = F{01). ■
Proposition 4 Let F  G be a unanimous r-self-selective SC F  and ÎR G 
with F (1R) -  a. li B  C. Im is such that a ^  B, then F (1R |/„\s)  ^
r(3i)\{a}.
Proof: Assume that F(iR |/,„\b) = b E r(iR)\{a}. Take some G G such that 
G{Jl) =  b. Set Ai = {F,G}. Then L(Ai,3?) = {Li} for some Li E L(Ai)^. By 
r-self-selectivity, F(Li) =  F. Consider IR |/„,\b · Take some F  G such that 
H{Jl) = a E  Im- Set A 2 = {F,H}.  Then £(^2,31) = {L2 } for some L2 E £ (^ 2 )^· 
^Here we extend neutrality. Let F  be a finite set. Let a : P  -> P  be a bijection. F is said to 
be neutral if and only if a{F{G)) = F(I), where /  is a linear order profile on P  and F  is the 
permuted linear order profile on I.
11
By T-self-selectivity, F{L2) = F. Now define a bijection a : A\ —>· A 2 such that 
a{F) — H, a{G) =  F. By neutrality,
F(L2) -  a (F (L iJ )  =  a(F(L2) = <j{F) = H.
However, this contradicts with F{L2) = F. Thus, ii a ^  B, then ^
r{3i)\{a}. m
P roposition  5 Let F  G be a unanimous r-self-selective SC F  m ^  3, |A^ | = 
n ^  2,-/V = {ji, ^ N with k < n and a,c G Im- Let I R , G
be such that ArgrnaxT = a, for all i e and Argmax^^ = c, for all
i G {jk+i, · ·. ,in}; A rgm axT  =  a, for all i G { j i , .. ■ Jk+i} and Argmax^^ = c, 
for all i G {jk+2, ■ ■ ■)in}· If F(3^) =  a, then F (^ ) =  o.
Proof: Let us consider the following four profiles: , where we
assume,without loss of generality that ji =  i for each i E N', a ^  c and b ^ {a, c}.
Jl' :
0 1:
1 k k + l k + 2 .. . n 1 k k + l k 2i
a a c c c a .... a c c
b b a b b b . .. b b b
c c b a a c . .. c a a
1 k k + l k + 2 .. . n 1 .. . k k + l k-l·2
a a b c c 01:
a .. . a b c
b b c b b b .. . b a b
c c a a a c .. . c c a
n
c
b
a
n
c
b
a
Since F  is tops only F{0i) =  a implies F{0i') — F{01) 
follows that F{% |{a.c}) = a· Now let us consider F{%).
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= o. By Proposition 4, it
Case 1:
Assume that F (^ ) =  b. Then from Proposition 4, it follows that |{a,6}) =  b. 
Note that the relative positions of a and b in ^  are the same as those of a and c in 
ÍR. Thus, if we combine this with the neutrality of F  we get F (^  | =  c. But
this contradicts with F {^  |{o,c}) =  0,- 
Case 2:
Assume that F(!K) =  c. Clearly, by Proposition 4 it follows that F{Ji |{a,c}) = 
F {^  \ {a,c})  = c. But this will again contradict with F {^  |{a,c>) = o.
Thus F(%) =  a. Since F  is tops only, we have F{Úi) = a. Again by Proposition 
4, |{a,c}) =  o. Joining this with Proposition 3, we get F{Ji) = a. ■
C orollary 1 Let F  G be a unanimous SC F  and Ji, ^  G ■ Assume
that F(R) = a and Argmax%'’ =  Argmax'X' for all i G N \{ j} ,  where j  is an agent 
with ArgrnaxJV /  a and Argmax%^ — a. If F  is r-self-selective, then F{%) =  a.
Proof: Assume that Argmax'JÚ = a.If ArgmaxOl^ — a for all i G N \{ j} ,  then 
by unanimity F {^) — a.
So let assume that Argmax'J& =  6 ^ {a, c} for some k ^ N  and = b.
By hypothesis we have ^(1)?) =  a and hence by Proposition 4, |{a,6}) =  a.
Now consider Jl' which is defined as follows: IR'® = J?® |{a,6} for all i G N \{ j}  
and aJl’^ b. By Proposition 5, we will have F{01') — a. Now since F(!R) =  b, again 
by Proposition 4, we have |{a,6}) =  b. But note that %' = % |{o,6}, whence 
F{01') =  6, in contradiction with F(Jl') — a. So, F{5i) = a. M
P roposition  6 Let F  G N®" be a unanimous SCF. If F  is r-self-selective, then 
F  satisfies IIA.
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Proof: The crucial point in this proposition is to show that, for Jl G if
b ^ t {‘JV) and F{Jl) = a, then jF(1R |{a,6}) =  a. Let us prove this.
Now consider any agent who prefers b to a. Note that if there is no such agent, 
then by unanimuity it follows that F{5i ¡{a,*}) =  a.
So let us suppose that there exists some agent j  who prefers b to a. Since 
b ^ r(iR), there is some c ^ {a,b} such that ArgmaxJV = c. Let us consider any 
agent k E N:
Case 1:
If agent k prefers c to o and a to b according to 3?*^ , then change her preference 
ordering so as to make her prefer a to c and c to b.
Case 2:
If agent k prefers 6 to a and o to c according to 31^ , then change her preference 
ordering so as to make her prefer 6 to c and c to a.
Now consider all agents who prefer c to a and a to 6 according to IR. If we apply 
the operation described in Case 1 to all such agents, we get a new profile 3?'. By 
the conjuction Corollary 1 and the tops onlyness, we will have F{Jl') = a.
Now consider all agents who prefer b to a and o to c according to 01'. If we 
apply the operation described in Case 2 to all such agents, we get a new profile 
IR from 01'. Since F  is tops only and tops did not change, then F (^)  =  a. By 
Proposition 4, we will have F(IR |{o,c}) =  o. Now consider 31 |{a,6}· Define a bijection 
a : {a, c} —^ {o,,b}, where a(a) =  a,a(c) = b. By neutrality of F  it follows that 
F {^  |{a,c}) =  F{011 {a,6}) =  a·
Now take any B C Im with a =  F (1R) ^ B, and suppose that F{01) ^  F{01') -  
b, where 01' = Oi Then IR |{a,6}= |{a,6} with {o,¿} C r(IR'). Now, however,
F{0i' ^ T{0i')\{b}, or equivalently, F{0i' |(a,fc}) = b hy Proposition 4, in
14
contradiction with F{Jl |{a,6}) = o,. ■
Corollary 2 Let F  G be a unanimous SCF. F  is r-self-selective if and only
if F  is dictatorial.
Proof: The if part is obvious. For the only if part, since we showed that F  satisfies 
IIA , then by Koray (1999) it follows that F  is dictatorial. ■
But wc will also prove directly that a neutral, unanimous, tops only, r-self- 
selective SC F  F  is dictatorial. Before presenting the direct proof, however, we will 
give a second proof in which we will show that such an F  is monotonic, and hence 
dictatorial by Miiller-Satterthwaite Theorem.
For any SI G , let us denote the set of individuals whose best elements
according to iR are a by S'a(iR). That is, 5'a(IR) = {^  G | ArgmaxR^ = a}.
P roposition  7 Let F  G be a unanimous r-self-selective SCF, and IR, iR G 
Let F{‘R) = a. If Fa(!R) =  then F(!R) =  a.
Proof: Firstly let us consider the set
V = {i E N  \ ArgmaxSC ^  Argm ax^'’}.
If F  7^  0, then F(;R) =  F(IR) = a since F  is tops only. Otherwise, take any j  G V. 
Assume that Argmax^^ = c and ArgmaxSV =  h. Consider any k G N \S a {^ '· 
Case 1:
If agent k prefers c to a and a to 6 according to Sl'^ , then change her preference 
ordering so as to make her prefer c to 6 and b to o.
Case 2:
If agent k prefers b to a and a to c according to !R*, then change her preference 
ordering so as to make her prefer 6 to c and c to a.
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If we apply Case 1 , and Case 2 to all k E N\Sa{R), we will get a new profile iR. 
Since tops did not change, F{‘k)  =  = a. Now from Proposition 4, it follows
that F{‘Jl |{o,t}) =  0,- Let us consider a new profile which is obtained from IR 
just by pushing alternative c to the top in Consider IR ¡{a,;,} and Now
define a bijc'ction a : {o, b} {a, c}, where a(a) = a, a{b) = c. From neutrality of 
F  we will have F{{k |{a,6}) = F’(IR(j) |{a,c}) =  o. Thus it follows that F{%(^ j)) =  a. By 
continuing in this way, one can change the top elements of each agent j  in JV so as to 
make it cciual to the top element of for all j  e V. Let us denote this final profile 
by ji. Clearly, because of above process F(!R) =  a. Since A rgm ax^’· = Argmax^^ 
for all i E N, it follows that F{3i) = a. ■
P roposition  8 Let F  G be a unanimous r-self-selective SC F  and iR, IR € 
If F{3i) = a and Fa W  C Fa(lR), then F(1R) =  a.
Proof: Consider any k E N \Sa{^)· Change the preference ordering IR^  so as to 
equal to IR*. Denote the final preference profile by !R. By Proposition 7, we will 
have F f^ ) =  a. Now take and push alternative a to the top for all agents 
i E Fa(^). Let us denote this profile by IR. By Corollary 1, we get F(!R) =  a. Now, 
since Argmax%^ =  Argmax%^ for alH G 77 and F  is tops only, we get F (^ ) = a.
m
C orollary 3 Let F  G be a unanimous SCF. If F  is r-self-selective, then it is 
monotonic.
Proof: Let iR, IR G Assume that F(IR) =  a, and in {x E Im \ aJl'^x} D
{x E Im \ for all k E N. Note that in this case Sa{0i) C Fa(lR). By
Proposition 8, it follows that F(:R) =  a. So, F  is monotonic. ■
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C orollary 4 Let F  € N’’ be a unanimous SCF. If F  is r-self-selective, then it is 
dictatorial.
Proof: Since F  G is a unanimous and r-self-selecetive SCF, then by Corollary 
3 F  is rnonotonic. Hence by Miiller-Sathertwaite Theorem, F  is dictatorial. Note 
that, in fact we just proved that Fm is dictatorial. To prove that F  is dictatorial 
we follow Koray (1999).
Now let us consider any k > I 3. Let Oi e he defined as follows: For
any t € /fc-i; t'JV'''' {t +1) and {t + 1)%H for all j  G N \{ik}. Then F(IR |/J = 1 since 
F  satisfies IIA . But for each j  G N \ik, Argraaxj^H |/,= 1 ^ 1 .  Thus, 4  =  k-
Finally, take any % G £ ( /2)^. Define ^  G as follows: for any i G N
and any x ,y  E / 2, x ^ ’^y if and only if xJV'y, and for any 1 G N  and x G l2,x^^3. 
Then F{5i) G /2 since F  is Paretian and F {^) = Argmaxj^^'’^ . But since F  also 
satisfies I IA  and ^  [/2= %  we have F(IR) =  F{01). Moreover, by construction of 
Argmaxf^^^^ = Argmaxi^JV’'^ , implying that F(9?) =  Argrnaxi^‘X'°. So Iq is 
dictator when m = 1 , we conclude that F  is dictatorial. ■
P roposition  9 Let F  G be a unanimous SC F  . Let E L(/m)^, and 
F{Jl) =  o. Assume that S'a(9l)\{j} C for some j  E N  with Argmaxik·  ^ =  b.
If F  is r-self-selective, then F(!K) G {a, 6}.
Proof: First note that, if a =  6, then the result follows by Proposition 8. Now 
^  G be such that T  T  for all i E N \Sa{^), and A rgm axT  = a for
all i E Sa{0l). By Proposition 8, F (^ ) =  a. Assume that F(I^) = c ^ {(^ib}. Now 
rearrange the order of alternatives a and c in profile ^  in such a way that in the 
final profile, call it the relative positions of a and c are the same with as in ^  (Of 
course by changing if necessary, so that o^^c). Clearly, since the tops did not
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change, we got F{±) = a. On the one hand, if Sa{^) ^  0, then =  c by
Proposition 4, implying that F{±  =  c since ^  |{a,c}= ^  |{a.c}· On the other
hand, if =  0, then 5'a(3i) =  {j}. Now, however, we again have |{a,c}) = c
by Corollary 1 . But this contradicts F {^) = a. ■
Lem m a 1 Let F  e be a unanimous and r-self-selective SCF. Let 3?, G 
L (/to)^, and F(0l) = a. Assume that there is some j  E N  such that = JV = 
for all i G N \{ j} ,  and Argmax^^ =  b, Argmax5l^ = c where c ^ {a, 6}. Now if 
F{%) = 6, then F {^) — c
Proof: Note that, since S'a(3?)\{i} C 5'a(^) and Sb{^)\{j}  C Sb{^) together 
with =  a and F(5l) = b, we have F{%) G {o, c} and F {^) G {ft, c}. Thus,
F { ^ )  = c. ■
Lem m a 2 Let F  G be a unanimous and r-self-selective SCF. Let
and F{Jl) = a. Assume that OV = IR* for all i G N \{ j} ,  and Argmax^^ = 
Argmax'R^ = ft, for some j  G 5'a(lli). Now if F (^ ) =  ft, then F(!X) = ft.
Proof: Consider a new profile which is defined as follows: Argm,ax^^ = Argmax5i\ 
i G 5'a(3 )^; Argmax%^ = A rgm ax^\ i G N \Sa{^)·
Consider Sb{^)· If ArgmaxOl'^ = Argmax^^ for any k G then
C 5ft(IK) which, together with F01) — ft, implies that F(IR) =  ft by Propo­
sition 8. Otherwise, take any k G 5'6(lK)\{y} with ArgmaxSi'^ Argmax%'^ = c. 
Without toss of generality assume that c /  o. Interchange the positions of ft and c in 
and denote the profile thus obtained by 1K(a;). By Proposition 9, F(lK(fe)) G (ft, c}. 
Assume that F(IK(fc)) =  c. Now interchange a and ft in !K(fc) and denote this new 
profile by IK. Since F(^(fc)) =  c, then by Proposition 7, F{%) = c. But, note that 
F(1R) =  a, and Sa{0l) C Sa{^)· Thus by Proposition 8 it follows that F(!K) = a. 
Thus, F(!K(A:)) =  ft.
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If we continue this process for all k G Sb{^)\{j}  we get a new profile, denote 
it and F (^)  =  b. Note that Sb{^) C Sb{^)· Thus by Proposition 8, we get
F ( ! K )  = b .  m
T heorem  1 Let F  G be a unanimous SCF. F  is universally self-selective if 
and only if F is dictatorial.
Proof: The if part is obvious.
For the only if part, let 01 G and F(0l) = a e Im- Pick any j  G Sa(Ol).
Change it with some 6 7^  a. Let us denote this profile by Ol(j).
Case 1 F(0i( j^)) = b.
By Lemma 1, it follows that F(lR(j·)) =  b for any b G Im- By Lemma 2, for any 
^  G F(!R) = A rg m a x^ f  Hence agent j  is dictator.
Case 2 F{'R( j^f) =  a.
Set Si = Sa\{j}· Now take any agent k G Si- Apply the above procedure for 
agent k G Si- Continuing in this way, it easily follows that there exists a dictato­
rial agent, since Sa{0l) is finite. Hence F  is dictatorial. ■
If a unanimous F  G is r-self-selective then it is dictatorial by above theorem 
from which it follows that F  is strategy proof and monotonic (Recall that we 
directly proved the monotonicty). However the converse may not be true. That is, 
a unanimous SC F  F  G which is stratergy proof (or monotonic) need not be 
r-self-selective. For example, let a,b E N  with a ^  b and for each m which is odd, 
let F  be dictatoriality o; while for each m  even, let F  be dictatorship of b. Clearly, 
F  is unanimous and strategy-proof (monotonicity), but it is not r-self-selective
^Here again we just showed that Fm is dictatorial. But dictatoriality of F follows from the 
second part of the proof of Corollary 4.
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(Koray, 1999). This situation arises because monotonicity and strategy-proofness 
of F  treat the “components” of F  separately. But conjoining these conditions 
with I IA  we get the universally iau-selectiveness for F. The following corollary is 
taken from Koray (1999).
C orollary 5 Let F E be unanimous
1. F is T-self-selective if and only if F  is monotonic and satisfies IIA .
2. F is T-self-selective if and only if F is straytegy-proof and satisfies IIA .
Proof: We will only prove the first assertion, since the proof of second is similar. 
The “only if’ part follows from above theorem. Now assume that F  is monotonic 
and satisfies IIA . Then F^, is monotonic for each m G N. But then by Miiller- 
Satterthwaite (1977) Theorem, Fm is dictatorial for all m ^  3. Now as in the proof 
of the theorem, I IA  implies that the dictator must be the same for all m ^  3. In 
the proof of the second assertion, Gibbard(1973)-Satterthwaite(1973) Theorem is 
used. ■
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Chapter 3
D om ain R estriction in Preference 
ProfilesrSingle-Peaked Preferences
3.1 Basic N otations and Definitions
D efinition 10 A complete preorder preference relation Oi is single-peaked with 
respect to the linear order > on 1^, if there is an alternative a £ Im with the 
property that
if a > c > 6, then c%h, and if 6 > c > a, then c%b.
D efinition 11  Given a linear order > on /^ , we denote by the collection
of all complete preorders.
Given IR e L{Im)> and a finite nonempty subset A  of K, for any G ,H  e % 
we say that G '^ H  \i and only if G{%) ^  Glearly ^  is a complete preorder
on A. Let L>(A., IR) stands for the set of linear order profiles induced on A. by iR 
which are single peaked with respect to some linear order on A  compatible with
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D efinition 12 Given F  G K, m G N, IR G and a finite subset of }\i with
F ^ A, we say that F  is self-selective at Jl relative to A  if and only if there exists 
some L G £/>(^1,3?) such that F  =  F{L). Moreover, we say that F is self-selective 
at 3? if and only if F  is self-selective at Jl relative to any subset >/1 of K with F E A. 
Finally, F  is said to be self-selective on the single-peaked domain if and only if F  
is self-selective at each 3? G UmeN ·
For any i G N, we denote by pi G Im the maximal alternative for R \  and 
P = {pi \ i E N}. Moreover, we rank these peaks from smallest to largest with 
respect to >, denoting p’^ the smallest element of PF
3.2 Result
P roposition  10 Let P  be a unanimous SCF, and 3? G L{Im)>· If F(fk) =  p’^ , for 
some fixed k ^  |A |^, then F self-selective on the single-peaked domain.
Proof: The crucial point is to construct the appropriate L, for which F{L) — F. 
Let A  be a finite set of SCFs. Set Ax — {G E ^  \ G{R) = x}, for each x G Im- We 
will rank Ax and Ay as follows:
j\.x ^ X < y .
For each Ax break ties among functions arbitrarily and fix that final order^. 
By continuing in this way, we will get a linear order on A. Denote this final order
Tn determining p*, we take the multiplicityof peaks into account. That is, if, for example,
N = h, and Pi =P 3 =P 5 =  1,P4 = 3,P2 =  4, then p^ =  Lp“* = 3,...and so on.
^For example, if we have Ai = {Gi,02,03} and A2 = {GiyO }^, then we will order Os as
Gi ,G3,Gi ,G5,G4.
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as > (A). Now we will construct L e  £>(>i)(yi,0l) as follows: For any agent i e N,
consider Лр..
i If F  G Ap., then fix F  and let L· be such that
F > G > H = ^  G U H  
F < G < H  ^  G F H
for any G, H E A.
ii If F ^ Ap^, then choose and fix any G* E A  and let U  be such that
G * > G > H ^  G D H  
G* < G < H  ^  G D H
for any G, H E A.
Set Py — {x & Irn \ X < p*}· Since F{'X) = p^, then there are at least к agents 
whose peaks are either p'^  or less than p* with respect to > on /„i. Consider any such 
“agent г” . Since his preference ordering is single-peaked, then there is no a; G 
such that x'X'p’^ . Hence in the corresponding L·, ArgmaxU  ^  F , with respect to 
> on L{A). Obviously, from construction of L and > (Л), we get F{L) — L. Ш 
Let us illustrate all these in a simple example.
Exam ple 2 Let F  be a unanimous SGF. Let 01 G ¿(Д)® be as follows:
Oi d2 (^ 3 CI4
1 2 2 3 4
2 3 1 2 3
3 4 3 1 2
4 1 4 4 1
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Let ^  2 and yi =  {F, G ,//, J, T}, F(3i) =  1 , G(3^) =  2, J(3?) =  3,
T{X) = 4. Now according to our construction, > {A) is given by F  F  G J  T; 
while L is shown in the table below:
follows:
Oi d2 d3 CI4
H F F J T
F G G G J
G J H F G
•J T J H F
T H T T H
get F(L) =  F. Now le
tti d2 d3 CI4 05
3 2 2 3 4
2 3 3 2 3
1 4 4 1 2
4 1 1 4 1
Assume that A  is the same as above, and that this new profile H, G, J, T  select 
the same alternatives as in the previous case. Under IR the corresponding > (A.) 
will not change, but L will be as follows:
Oi 02 03 (24 05
F G G F T
J F F J J
G J J G F
H T T H G
T H H T H
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Note that here, F (^ ) = 3 7  ^ 2, and furthermore F(L) =  F. Hence, here we have 
an example where F  is not dictatorial.
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Chapter 4
Conclusion
4.1 Conclusion
Koray (1998) analyzed the problem of self-selectivity and found that universal 
self-selectivity implies dictatoriality under unanimity and neutrality assumptions 
for social choice functions. In this study we explored to what extent we could 
escape from this dictatorial result by “localizing” the notion of self-selectivity. 
In the first step, we restricted the set of neutral social choice functions to the 
tops only domain. We proved that the result was again dictatoriality. Hence we 
could not escape Koray’s negative result. In the second step, we restricted the set 
of preference profiles to single-peaked ones. We considered this case, because we 
knew that whenever the preferences of all agents are single-peaked with respect 
to the same linear order a Condorcet winner existed (Mas-Colell, et.al, 1995). 
Hence in this domain a nondictatorial aggregation is possible. Like this result, we 
showed that there were some self selective social choice functions which were not 
dictatorial.
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There are several directions in which the present work could be extended. 
Firstly, note that we showed that even under the restriction of the set of social 
choice functions to the tops only case we could not escape from dictatoriality. 
Hence a natural question here is what happens if we restrict the set of rivals to 
other more restricted domains. Secondly, in the second section we just constructed 
some families social choice functions which were self-selective but not dictatorial 
without a full characterization. A full characterization of self-selecetivity of SCFs  
on the single-peaked domain waits to be done. Thirdly, as Koray noted in his work, 
the present work can be extended to social choice correspondences.
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